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RECENT DECISIONS
is a matter of speculation, but it is clear that this decision has served
to re-emphasize the need for statutory clarification and stabilization of
the retail credit picture. In light of the recent decisions of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, it is obvious that such legislative action cannot
fail to benefit the retail seller as well as the installment purchaser.
MICHAEL S. NOLAN
Legal Ethics: Attorney Disciplined for Unprofessional Conduct
-Defendant-attorney was found guilty of unprofessional conduct in
an action instigated upon complaint of the Board of State Bar Com-
missioners. This finding was based upon two grounds. The first related
to the maintenance of a neon "Income Tax" sign in the defendant's
window, and the second concerned the allowance in his office of an
income tax service conducted by his wife, a nonprofessional. Noting
that this was a "test" case involving somewhat common practices, the
court merely reprimanded the defendant and ordered him to pay costs
not to exceed $200.'
In its opinion the court pointed out that the placement of the "In-
come Tax" sign called attention to the defendant's law office as the
place where such service could be obtained. This, it felt, was a form
of advertising, which amounted to solicitation of business, thus being
unprofessional conduct. The court rejected defendant's argument that
because nonprofessionals are permitted to engage in such service, his
performance, within narrow, nonlegal limits, was engagement in a
business in which he was free to advertise. The court concluded that the
public interest would not be best served by allowing advertisement on
the part of attorneys who render tax services.
The court looked at the problem of office sharing as a permissive
practice, but only in certain instances. In the Willenson case the court
held that the arrangement amounted to unprofessional conduct. There
must be evidence of a physical separation which indicates the inde-
pendence of the parties such that patrons of the other enterprise will
be apprised of the lack of supervisory control by the attorney.
The refusal of the defendant-attorney to remove the sign upon re-
quest subjected him to possible disbarment or a substantial period of
suspension. However, it is questionable whether the court would have
imposed such stringent sanctions even absent the nature of the case as
a "test" case.
An attorney may be disciplined for actions that contravene
the ethics of his profession even though his conduct is neither
criminal nor calculated to obstruct justice .... It has also been
said that unprofessional conduct that will justify disbarment
1 State v. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W. 2d 452 (1963).
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must have an element of immorality or dishonesty, or must vio-
late private interests or the public good.2
The sanction which will be imposed varies among the courts. They con-
sider the nature of the act, the customs of the community, and the inter-
ests of the public which are to be served.3
There have been numerous reasons given for the persistence and
strict enforcement of the rules governing advertising and soliciting by
members of the legal profession. The lack of benefit to the public is
one of the reasons most frequently given. The result of unrestrained
advertising would be to increase litigation in that attorneys would be
competing for business. This encouragement of courtroom controversy
would bring about a lowering of the whole tone of the administration
of justice.
If the practice of law is to remain a profession and not to become
a mere trade, it is quite as important that ethical practioners
be protected from unfair competition within the profession as
from the unauthorized practice of law outside the profession by
laymen and corporations. But this is not the only aspect of these
canons. Their enforcement is of concern not merely to the mem-
bers of the profession. It is equally essential to the public. Our
citizens have a right to expect from the members of a learned
profession who are granted by the State the privilege to practice
law that they will live up to the standards long recognized at
common law and in large part codified in the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics.4
While it is usually necessary to examine the statutes, common law,
decisions, canons, usages and customs, and practice of the bar in most
instances to gain an accurate picture of the duties and obligations of
the lawyer, 5 it was not necessary to do so in the Willenson case because
violation of Canon 276 was readily apparent without more.
2 7 AM.. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law §38, at 66 (1963).
3 See Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P. 2d 508(1950), where the court dismissed a disciplinary action against attorneys due
to the absence of any prior decision holding that it was improper for attorneys
to participate in a plan to render legal aid to members of a labor union. The
court reasoned that the ends of justice could best be served by giving an
opinion which would serve prospectively as a guide to members of the pro-
fession. In re Veach, 1 Ill. 2d 264, 115 N.E. 2d 257 (1953) held that the acts
of an attorney, violating professional ethics (solicitation of personal injury
cases), are not excusable even though they are in accord with established
customs, and are free of criminality, fraud, or deceit. Nor was practice as a
professional bondsman excusable on grounds of custom. In re Meldrun, 243
Iowa 777, 51 N.W. 2d 881 (1952).
4 In re Rothman, 12 N.j. 528, 97 A. 2d 621, 625 (1953).
5 DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 211-212 (1953).
6 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Canon
27: "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter
of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se
improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
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The Ethics Committee of the Wisconsin Bar Association has at
times passed on the propriety of signs such as the one used by defendant.
Their position was relied on in the Willenson case.
A lawyer may display a dignified window sign, shingle, or
door sign to designate his office. It should not be gaudy or in
bad taste. There must be no neon sign or other illuminated letter-
ing. A black or gold lettered sign is the customary usage. A
lawyer may not advertise a collection agency, income tax service
or claims service. Lawyers may not permit laymen, who share
office space with them to use window signs to display matter
which would be prohibited to an attorney. One or two instances
have been reported that a lay tax return preparer shares space
with an attorney and displays a neon or red and white painted
sign in the window of the same suite of offices which the lawyer
occupies. The committee has held this to be improper. All adver-
tising in the lawyers office windows must conform to proper
standards. (Emphasis added.) 7
The blueprint of ethical advertising has very narrow limitations.
A lawyer may properly identify his office, use professional cards and
letterheads, and list his name in telephone directories. The only two
specialties which may be referred to on an attorney's business card are
maritime and patent law." As the court suggested in the Willenson case,
a bar association directory, rather than individual advertising, can be
used to apprise the public of attorneys who perform income tax
servicesY
That an attorney has a right to engage in a business which is inde-
pendent from the practice of law almost goes without saying. There is
a difficulty, particularly in tax service, in attempting to distinguish non-
professional aid and use of legal knowledge with consequent dispensing
of legal advice.10 Maintaining a law office in conjunction with a non-
personal communications or interviews, is unprofessional. It is equally un-
professional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the
drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships
or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes
in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the
lawyer's positions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and
lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable."
7 Wis. B. Bull. Feb., 1962, p. 30.
8 DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 245.
9 State v. Willenson, supra note 1, at 562, 123 N.W. 2d at 456.
10 DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 221, "Where the second occupation, although
theoretically and professionally distinct, is one closely related to the practice
of law, and one which normally involves the solution of what are essentially
legal problems, it is inevitable that, in conducting it, the lawyer will be
confronted with situations where, if not technically, at least in substance he
will violate the spirit of the Canons, particularly that precluding advertising
and solicitation. The likelihood of this is the greatest when the collateral
business is one which, when engaged in by a lawyer, constitutes the practice
of law, and when it is conducted from his law office."
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professional also raises a problem. Sharing of office space, clerical help,
and other items of expense are not in and of themselves unprofessional
conduct. The danger which lurks in such practices, however, is that
the public may be induced to believe that the services are of a profes-
sional nature when in fact they are not. Therefore, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has quite logically decreed that no display or advertising
inconsistent with the Canons should be allowed to appear in connection
with a law office.
A further problem in this regard arises under Canon 34 which pro-
vides that there can be no division of fees for legal services, except be-
tween attorneys who have rendered a portion of the services or shared
some responsibility.1 1
The guidelines which the Wisconsin court has approved with re-
spect to the advertising of an independent non-legal business are those
of the Committee of Professional Ethics of the State Bar of Wisconsin.
1. The independent nonlegal business should be clearly and to-
tally separated from the legal practice.
2. Letterheads, cards, and all advertising of independent busi-
ness must contain no reference or inference to status of the
individual as an attorney nor as to legal services.
3. It is desirable that the independent business have wholly sepa-
rate locations from the legal practice, but if that is impossible
the physical distinction should be made clear and definite as
the circumstances permit.
4. There must be wholly separate telephone and other directory
listings as well as wholly separate telephones and telephone
numbers.
5. Signs of the other business must be wholly separate and to
avoid the unethical "feeder" possibility, it would seem grossly
inappropriate to have a gaudy or flashy other sign next to a
modest shingle.'2
An attorney is not permitted to participate in an advertised agency
doing business in adjustment and investigation of claim service, collec-
tion service, or income tax service. This is because these activities are
deemed to be inherent "feeders" for law practice."
The attorney is bound by similar requirements when he shares his
office with a nonprofessional. There must be an obvious physical sepa-
ration such that patrons will be clearly apprised thereof. Further, the
lack of supervisory control by the attorney must be apparent. The pa-
tron must also have knowledge that he need not consult the particular
attorney for legal advice, but is free to choose any attorney. 4
1 Conceivably, an arrangement of office sharing could result in the payment of
a percentage to the nonlegal partner in the office for business which the lawyer
retains as a direct result of his office sharing.
12 Wis. B. Bull., June, 1960, p. 47, 49.
13 Ibid.
14 State v. Willenson, supra note 1, at 528, 123 N.W. 2d at 457.
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The difficulty which Justice Dietrich, in his dissenting opinion in
the Willenson case, finds is in the placement of an affirmative duty upon
the attorney to make the independence of the operation apparent to the
general public. He would prefer that it be incumbent upon one chal-
lenging the arrangement at least to allege 'that the operations are not
in fact independent. 15 However, it does not appear to this author that the
burden placed upon the attorney is too great in light of the public in-
terest which is to be protected.
In the Willenson case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court laid down
definite requirements which must be observed by an attorney who
wishes to engage in an independent business or share an office with a
nonprofessional. Adherence to the Canons of Ethics regarding adver-
tising is of primary importance. Further, the attorney has a duty to
make an obvious physical separation of the nonlegal business from the
legal business. Future conduct of the type involved in this case will not
be tolerated and it is evident that the court will continue to regulate the
professional conduct of attorneys very strictly.
COLLEEN A. RoAcH
Domestic Relations: The Present Law on Artificial Insemination
-Few topics have engendered such great controversy in the past years
as that of artificial insemination (hereinafter called AI). The social,
moral,' religious, and legal problems raised by this relatively new medi-
cal technique defy treatment in a single article; in fact, the very inter-
relationship of these disciplines has so complicated this topic that a
veritable paralysis has resulted in the law concerning AI. Yet, the legal
profession cannot close its eyes to the serious nature of this problem.
AI cannot be treated as a passing fad performed upon some insistent
childless women as an experiment of sorts. Statistics on AI are at best
conjecture because of the secrecy involved in its administration; how-
ever, some have estimated that approximately 100,000 American fami-
lies have had children through the AI procedure and all seem to agree
that its use will increase.2 Thus, an examination of the present status
of the law and possible future legislation on AI seems in order. It is
this author's position that AI should be examined and analyzed from a
public policy viewpoint, placed in the general setting of Judeo-Christian
morality which prevails in our American society, yet divorced as much
as possible from the detailed religious problems involved.
The method used to effect artificial insemination is of vital legal
significance. There are three types of AI used by physicians to im-
15 Id. at 529, 123 N.W. 2d at 458.
1 For an excellent discussion of the sociological, religious, and ethical aspects
of artificial insemination see Rice, A.ID.--An Heir to Controversy, 34 NoT
DAME LAW. 510 (1959).
2 Weinberger, A Partial Solution to Legiiimacy Problems Arising From the
Use of Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L. J. 143 (1960).
